Ανάλυση του The Economist και δηλώσεις μου για τις πολιτικές εξελίξεις στην Ελλάδα

ON JULY 5th Greeks appeared to signal, through an overwhelming referendum result, that the reform demands made by Europe were too onerous to accept. Less than a week later, on July 11th, the Greek parliament passed a bill—with a majority of 251 out of 300 votes—giving the government of prime minister Alexis Tsipras authorisation to negotiate a bail-out deal with creditors, in light of a proposal that includes conditions harsher than those rejected at the referendum. The government did not need parliamentary authorisation for this, but now that it has it, the Greek political leadership appears to present an unusually united front. This extraordinary about face may not end up achieving anything; the European leaders now meeting in Brussels may decide that Greece cannot be trusted and must go. The reversal in the Greek stance is nonetheless remarkable. How did Mr Tsipras go from imploring Greeks to vote down a package of reforms proposed by the creditors, which 62% of voters dutifully did, to begging the Greek parliament to sign up to an even harsher package less than a week later, and what consequences will the U-turn have?

One explanation is that Mr Tsipras has an extraordinary gift for persuasion; the fact that Athens isn’t currently being razed by betrayed “Oxi” (No) voters suggests as much. But the more compelling reason is that the Greeks have realised they cannot have their cake and eat it. The referendum promised the impossible: a less-harsh package of reforms and continued membership in the euro zone. But once it became clear that the euro zone creditors were in no mood to negotiate, Greek parliamentarians (and, it would seem, many Oxi voters) did not need long to determine that a Grexit would be more catastrophic than more austerity. “At least we had a go,” seems to be a common attitude.

Mr Tsipras’s conciliatory performance has surprised Mr Tsipras’s critics and, perhaps, given them hope for the future. “He finally chose country over party,” says one relieved member of the opposition. But it has cost him. Fifteen of his own MPs, including two ministers, revolted by voting against the bill, abstaining or staying at home, and another 15 signed a letter saying they only voted for the bill in order to protect the government’s majority. Yanis Varoufakis, until last week Mr Tsipras’s finance minister, skipped the vote entirely. Without the support of these defectors, Mr Tsipras in effect no longer holds a parliamentary majority. To regain it he has a few options. He could reshuffle his cabinet and demand that the defectors resign and hand over their votes. He could call for a new election, which he may do anyway later in the year. Or he could form a new coalition to make the numbers add up, most obviously with Potami and Pasok: two centre-left parties. Or European creditors may force his hand, calling for a technocratic government. They would certainly find a new, broader coalition more assuring of the Greek commitment to implementing reforms.

The show of support by opposition parties in the authorisation vote was a matter of pragmatism, rather than enthusiasm for the reform package. “Now is the time to do everything possible to keep Greece within the euro zone,” said opposition MP Niki Kerameus. “Now is not the time to discuss why Syriza went from promising 12 billion euros in grants to proposing 12 billion euros in austerity measures.” But such discussions will surely be had behind closed doors. The bill’s passage will probably lead to what many moderates had hoped all along: a split within Syriza that forces Mr Tsipras to rid the party of its extreme-left flank. As long as the current armistice amongst Greek politicians lasts, Mr Tsipras can enjoy wide support from outside his party. All this, together with the lack of popular unrest for now, presents an impressive show of Greek unity. But once a deal is signed—or rejected—the knives will surely come out again before long.

Η δημοσίευση του άρθρου στον παρακάτω σύνδεσμο:

http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/07/economist-explains-8?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/EETsiprasUturn